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Abstract
A classic problem in security is that of checking that a program has secure information ow.
Informally, this problem is described as follows: Given a program with variables partitioned into
two disjoint sets of \high-security" and \low-security" variables, check whether observations
of the low-security variables reveal any information about the initial values of the high-security
variables. Although the problem has been studied for serveral decades, most previous approaches
have been syntactic in nature, often using type systems and compiler data ow analysis techniques
to analyze program texts. This paper presents a considerably dierent approach to check secure
information ow, based on a semantic characterization. A semantic approach has several desirable
features. Firstly, it gives a more precise characterization of security than that provided by most
previous approaches. Secondly, it applies to any programming constructs whose semantics are
denable; for instance, the introduction of nondeterminism and exceptions poses no additional
problems. Thirdly, it can be used for reasoning about indirect leaking of information through
variations in program behavior (e.g., whether or not the program terminates). Finally, it can
be extended to the case where the high- and low-security variables are dened abstractly, as
functions of actual program variables. The paper illustrates the use of the characterization with
several examples and discusses how it can be applied in practice. c© 2000 Elsevier Science B.V.
All rights reserved.
0. Introduction
A classic problem in security is that of determining whether a given program has
secure information ow [3,4]. In its simplest form, this problem may be described
informally as follows: Given a program whose variables are partitioned into two disjoint
sets of \high-security" and \low-security" variables, check whether observations of
the low-security variables reveal anything about the initial values of the high-security
variables. A related problem is that of detecting covert ows, where information is
leaked indirectly, through variations in program behavior [12]. For instance, it may be
possible to deduce something about the initial values of the high-security variables by
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examining the resource usage of the program (e.g., by counting the number of times
it accesses the disk head).
Although this problem has been studied for several decades, most of the previous
approaches have been syntactic in nature, often using type systems and compiler data
ow analysis techniques to analyze program texts. In this paper, we present a con-
siderably dierent approach to secure information ow, based on a semantic notion
of program equality. A denition based on program semantics has several desirable
features. Firstly, it provides a more precise characterization of secure information ow
than that provided by most previous approaches. Secondly, it is applicable to any pro-
gramming construct whose semantics are dened; for instance, nondeterminism and
exceptions pose no additional problems. Thirdly, it can be used for reasoning about
indirect leaking of information through variations in program behavior (e.g., whether or
not the program terminates). Finally, it can be extended to the case where the high- and
low-security variables are dened abstractly, as functions of actual program variables.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. We start in Section 1 by infor-
mally describing the problem and discussing several small examples. We present our
formal characterization of security in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the nota-
tional conventions we use and also provide a short overview of relational and weakest
precondition semantics of sequential programs. In Section 4, we formulate our security
condition in relational terms and show that it corresponds to the notion used else-
where in the literature. In Sections 5 and 6 we show how to express our condition
in the weakest precondition calculus, which is somewhat more convenient to use in
verication. In Section 7, we discuss the main obstacles to applying our approach in
practice and propose a stronger condition that is easier to check. This is followed by
the discussion in Section 8 of how our techniques may be used even when the high-
and low-security variables are dened abstractly. We discuss related work in Section
9 and end with a short summary in Section 10.
1. Informal description of the problem
Consider a program whose variables are partitioned into two disjoint tuples h (de-
noting \high-security" variables) and k (denoting \low-security" variables). Informally
speaking, we say that such a program is secure if:
Observations of the initial and nal values of k do not provide any information about
the initial value of h.
(Notice that it is only the initial value of h that we care about.) We illustrate this
informal description of the problem with a few examples. Throughout our discussion,
we refer to an \adversary" who is trying to glean some information about the initial
value of h. We assume that this adversary has knowledge of the program text and of
the initial and nal values of k.
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The program
k := h
is not secure, since the initial value of h can be observed as the nal value of k.
However, the program
h := k
is secure, since k, whose value is not changed, is independent of the initial value of h.
Similarly, the program
k := 6
is secure, because the nal value of k is always 6, regardless of the initial value of h.
It is possible for an insecure program to occur as a subprogram of a secure program.
For example, in each of the four programs
k := h ; k := 6 (0)
h := k ; k := h (1)
k := h ; k := k − h (2)
if false then k := h end (3)
the insecure program k := h occurs as a subprogram; nevertheless, the four programs
are all secure.
There are more subtle ways in which a program can be insecure. For example, with
h; k of type boolean, the program
if h then k := true else k := false end
is insecure, despite the fact that each branch of the conditional is secure. This program
has the same eect as k := h, and the ow of information from h to k is called
implicit [4].
In the insecure programs shown so far, the exact value of h is leaked into k. This
need not always be the case: a program is considered insecure if it reveals any infor-
mation about the initial value of h. For example, if h and k are of type integer, neither
of the two programs shown below,
k := h  h
if 06h then k := 1 else k := 0 end ;
transmits the entire value of h, but both programs are insecure because the nal value
of k does reveal something about the initial value of h.
A nondeterministic program can be insecure even if the adversary has no knowledge
of how the nondeterminism is resolved. For example, the following program is insecure,
because the nal value of k is always very close to the initial value of h:
k := h− 1 L k := h+ 1
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(The operator L denotes demonic choice: execution of S L T consists of choosing any
one of S or T and executing it.) The program
skip L k := h
is also insecure, because if the initial and nal values of k are observed to be dierent,
then the initial value of h is revealed.
Finally, we give some examples of programs that transmit information about h
via their termination behavior. The nicest way to present these examples is by using
Dijkstra’s if  construct [6]. The operational interpretation of the program
if B0! S0 L B1! S1 
is as follows. From states in which neither B0 nor B1 is true, the program loops
forever; from all other states it executes either S0 (if B0 is true) or S1 (if B1 is true).
If both B0 and B1 are true, the choice between S0 and S1 is made arbitrarily. Now,
the deterministic program
if h = 0! loop L h 6= 0! skip  (4)
(where loop is the program that never terminates) is insecure, because whether or not
the program terminates depends on the initial value of h. Next, consider the following
two nondeterministic programs:
if h = 0! skip L true! loop  (5)
if h = 0! loop L true! skip  (6)
Note that program (5) terminates only if the initial value of h is 0. Although there is
always a possibility that the program will loop forever, if the program is observed to
terminate, the initial value of h is revealed; thus the program is considered insecure.
Program (6) is more interesting. If we take the view that nontermination is indistin-
guishable from slow execution, then the program is secure. However, if we take the
view that an adversary is able to detect innite looping, then it can deduce that the
initial value of h is 0, and the program should be considered insecure.
Remark. Readers may be wondering just how much time an adversary would have to
spend in order to \detect innite looping", so the second viewpoint above requires a
little explanation. One way to address the issue of nontermination is to require that
machine-specic timing information (which an adversary may exploit to detect nonter-
mination) be made explicit in the programming model (e.g., by adding a low-security
timer variable, which is updated by each instruction). Another way, which we adopt in
this paper, is to strengthen the denition of security by considering powerful adversaries
that can detect nontermination. As we will see later (Section 6.0) nontermination is an
issue only in the presence of nondeterminism. Even then, our denition is at worst a
little conservative, in that it classies a program such as (6) as insecure.
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We hope that these examples, based on our informal description of secure information
ow, have helped give the reader an operational understanding of the problem. From
now on, we will adopt a more rigorous approach. We start in the next section by
formally dening security in terms of program semantics.
2. Formal characterization
Our formal characterization of secure information ow is expressed as an equality
between two programs. We use the symbol := to denote program equality based on
total correctness and write \S is secure" to mean that program S has secure information
ow. (For now, we do not assign a concrete meaning to := ; that will be done in later
sections.)
A key ingredient in our characterization is the program
\assign to h an arbitrary value"
which we denote by HH (\havoc on h"). Program HH may be used to express some
useful properties. Firstly, observe that the dierence between a program S and the
program \HH ; S" is that the latter executes S after setting h to an arbitrary value.
Secondly, observe that the program \S ; HH" ‘discards’ the nal value of h result-
ing from the execution of S. We use these observations below in giving an informal
understanding of the following denition of security.
Denition (Secure information ow).
S is secure  (HH ; S ; HH := S ; HH) (7)
Using the two observations above, this characterization may be understood as fol-
lows: The occurrence of \;HH" on each side indicates that only the nal values of
k are of interest whereas the occurrence of \HH ;" on the left side indicates that the
program starts with an arbitrary assignment to h. Thus, the two programs are equal
provided that the nal value of k produced by S does not depend on the initial value of
h. In Section 4, we provide a more rigorous justication for this denition, by relating
it to a notion of secure information ow that has been used elsewhere in the literature,
but for now, we hope that this informal argument gives the reader some operational
understanding of our denition. In the rest of this section, we discuss some of the
features of our approach.
Firstly, note that we have not stated the denition in terms of a particular style of
program semantics (e.g., axiomatic, denotational, or operational). Sequential program
equality can be expressed in any of these styles and dierent choices are suitable for
dierent purposes. For instance, in this paper, we will use a relational semantics to
justify our characterization, but we will use weakest precondition semantics to obtain
a formulation that is more convenient to use in verication. Secondly, observe that our
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denition is given purely in terms of program semantics; thus it can be used to reason
about any programming construct whose semantics are dened. For instance, it can
be used for programs with nondeterminism and exceptions, as well as complex data
structures such as arrays, records, or objects. (In contrast, syntactic denitions such as
those based on type systems, typically need to be extended with the introduction of
new programming constructs.) Finally, note that our denition leaves open the decision
of how h and k are dened. Like some other approaches, one can reason about dierent
kinds of covert ows by introducing appropriate special variables and including them
in the low-security variables k. (For instance, one can deal with covert ows involving
timing considerations by including in k a program variable that records execution time,
c.f. [10].) Unlike other approaches, however, our denition does not require that h and
k be actual variables in the program. As we describe in Section 8, our approach
may be used even when h; k are dened abstractly, as functions of actual program
variables.
3. Notation and semantics primer
In later sections of this paper, we study our security condition using relational pro-
gram semantics, weakest precondition semantics and Hoare logic. This section explains
the notation we use, provides a short introduction to these semantics, and lists properties
relating them.
Much of our notation follows Dijkstra and Scholten’s book [8]. We use an inx,
left-associative dot to denote function application. For Q denoting either 8 or 9, we
write
(Q j : r :j : t : j )
to denote the quantication over all j satisfying r :j. Identier j is called the dummy,
r:j is called the range, and t:j is called the term of the quantication. When the range
is true or is understood from context, it is often omitted. We use similar notation to
dene sets, and write
f j : r :j : t : j g
to mean the set of all elements of the form t:j for j satisfying r:j.
3.0. Relational semantics
In relational semantics, a program is viewed as a relation over the extended state
space obtained by adding the special \looping state" 1 to the space formed by taking
the cartesian product of the domains of the program variables. Program equality := in
this semantics is relational equality = . We use the following notational conventions:
Identiers w; x; y; z denote program states (including 1). For any program variable v,
we write v:x to denote the value of v in state x. (We use the convention that v:1 is a
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special value ? that lies outside the domain of v.) For any relation S and states x and
y, we write xhSiy to denote that S relates x to y; this means that there is an execution
of program S from (initial) state x to (nal) state y. We assume that every program
S satises
(8 x :: 1hSix  x =1 ) (8)
which states that there is no exit from the looping state (c.f. [7]).
The identity relation is denoted by \Id" ; it satises xhIdiy  x = y for all x; y.
The universal relation is denoted by \true" ; it satises xhtrueiy for all x; y. The
symbols ; ; ;:;[ denote relational containment, composition, complement, and union,
respectively. We will use the facts that Id is a left- and a right-identity of composition
and that ; distributes over [ and is therefore monotonic with respect to  .
A program S is called miraculous if for some initial state x there is no nal state y
such that xhSiy. A non-miraculous program therefore corresponds to a relation that is
left-total, that is, a relation that satises
true  S ; true:
The relational semantics of the program HH are given as follows:
(8 x; y :: xhHH iy  k :x = k :y )
Note that the relation HH is both reexive and transitive:
Id  HH (9)
HH ; HH  HH (10)
3.1. Weakest precondition semantics and Hoare triples
In the weakest precondition semantics [6,8]. a program S is characterized by two
predicate transformers wlp :S (\weakest liberal precondition") and wp :S (\weakest pre-
condition") which are informally dened as follows: For any predicate p,
 wlp:S:p holds in exactly those initial states from which every terminating computation
of S ends in a state satisfying p, and
 wp:S:p holds in exactly those initial states from which every computation of S
terminates in a state satisfying p.
In relational terms, the predicate transformers wlp:S and wp:S satisfy the following
conditions: For any program S and any predicate p
(8 x :: (wlp:S:p):x  (8y : xhSiy : y =1 _ p:y )) (11)
(8 x :: (wp:S:p):x  (8y : xhSiy : y 6=1 ^ p:y )) (12)
These two transformers are related by the following pairing property: for any S
(8p :: wp:S:p = wlp:S:p ^ wp:S:true ) (13)
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For any program with a variable v, we dene the unary predicate transformer [v : ]
(read \v-everywhere") as
[v : p] = (8M :: wlp:\v := M":p )
where M ranges over the domain of v (not including ?). This unary predicate trans-
former has all the properties of universal quantication; in particular, it is universally
conjunctive. When v denotes the set of all variables of the program, we will abbreviate
[v : ] by [ ] (read \everywhere").
In weakest precondition semantics, program equality := is equality of wlp and wp :
S := T  (8p :: [wlp:S:p  wlp:T:p] ^ [wp:S:p  wp:T:p] )
which, on account of the pairing property (13), can be simplied to
S := T  (8p :: [wlp:S:p  wlp:T:p] ) ^ [wp:S:true  wp:T:true]
The wlp and wp semantics of the program HH are
(8p :: [wlp:HH:p  [h : p] ] )
[wp:HH:true  true]
Informally speaking, the total-correctness Hoare triple fp g S f q g states that, when
started in any state satisfying predicate p, program S is guaranteed to terminate in a
state satisfying predicate q. Formally, this triple is dened in terms of wp as follows.
For any program S and predicates p and q
fp g S f q g  [p ) wp:S:q]: (14)
4. Security in the relational calculus
In this section, we formally justify denition (7) by showing that it is equivalent to
the notion used elsewhere in the literature. Since that notion was given in operational
terms, we nd it convenient to use relational semantics.
In the relational semantics, condition (7) is expressed as follows:
S is secure
= f Denition (7), program equality := is relational equality = g
HH ; S ; HH = S ; HH
) f (9) and ; monotonic, hence HH ; S ; Id  HH ; S ; HH g
HH ; S  S ; HH
) f Applying \ ; HH" to both sides, using ; monotonic g
HH ; S ; HH  S ; HH ; HH
) f (10) and ; monotonic, hence S ; HH ; HH  S ; HH g
HH ; S ; HH  S ; HH
) f (9) and ; monotonic, hence Id ; S ; HH  HH ; S ; HH g
HH ; S ; HH = S ; HH
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Since the second expression equals the nal one, we have equivalence throughout, and
we have
S is secure  (HH ; S  S ; HH) (15)
This result is useful because it facilitates the following derivation, which expresses
security in terms of the values of program variables.
HH ; S  S ; HH
= f denition of relational containment g
(8 x; y :: xhHH ; Siy ) xhS ; HH iy )
= f denition of relational composition, twice g
(8 x; y :: (9w :: xhHH iw ^ whSiy )
) (9 z :: xhSiz ^ zhHH iy ))
= f relational semantics of HH , trading twice g
(8 x; y :: (9w : k:x = k:w : whSiy )
) (9 z : xhSiz : k:z = k:y ))
= f predicate calculus g
(8 x; y :: (8w : k:x = k:w :
whSiy ) (9 z : xhSiz : k:z = k:y )))
= f unnesting quantiers g
(8w; x; y : k:x = k:w :
whSiy ) (9 z : xhSiz : k:z = k:y )) ()
= f nesting g
(8w; x : k:x = k:w : (8y :: whSiy
) (9 z : xhSiz : k:z = k:y )))
= f Set calculus g
(8w; x : k:x = k:w : fy : whSiy : k:y g  f z : xhSiz : k:z g)
= f Expression is symmetric in w and x g
(8w; x : k:x = k:w : fy : whSiy : k:y g = f z : xhSiz : k:z g)
Thus, we have established that, for any S,
S is secure  (8w; x : k:w = k:x : fy : whSiy : k:y g
= f z : xhSiz : k:z g ) (16)
This condition says that the set of possible nal values of k is independent of the initial
value of h. It has appeared in the literature [2] as the denition of secure information
ow. (Similar denitions, restricted to the deterministic case, have appeared elsewhere
[19,20].) Thus, one may view the derivation above as a proof of the equivalence of
(7) with respect to the notion used by others.
Note that we have also shown (see formula () in the calculation above)
S is secure  (8w; x; y : k:w = k:x ^ whSiy :
(9 z : xhSiz : k:z = k:y )) (17)
This formulation of security will be useful in Section 6.
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5. Security in the weakest precondition calculus
In this section and the next, we show how our denition of secure information ow
may be expressed in the weakest precondition calculus [6]. Our rst formulation, pre-
sented in this section, involves a quantication over predicates; it is therefore somewhat
inconvenient to use. In the next section, we show how this formulation can be written
more simply as a condition involving a quantication over the domain of k.
In the weakest precondition semantics, the security condition (7) may be expressed
as follows:
HH ; S ; HH := S ; HH
= f Program equality in terms of wlp and wp g
(8p :: [wlp:(HH ; S ; HH):p  wlp:(S ; HH):p] )
^ [wp:(HH ; S ; HH):true  wp:(S ; HH):true]
= f wlp and wp of HH and ; g
(18)(8p :: [ [h : wlp:S: [h : p] ]  wlp:S: [h : p] ] )
(19)^ [ [h : wp:S:true]  wp:S:true]
The last formula above contains expressions in which a predicate q satises
[ [h : q]  q]:
Predicates with this property occur often in our calculations, so it is convenient to
introduce a special notation for them and identify some of their properties. This is the
topic of the following subsection.
5.0. Cylinders
Informally speaking, a predicate q that satises [q  [h : q] ] has the property that
its value is independent of the variable h. We refer to such predicates as \h-cylinders",
or simply as \cylinders" as h is understood from context. For notational convenience,
we dene the set Cyl of all h-cylinders:
Denition (Cylinders). For any predicate q,
q 2 Cyl  [q  [h : q] ] (20)
The following lemma provides several equivalent ways of expressing that a predicate
is a cylinder.
Lemma 0. For any predicate q; the following are all equivalent to q 2 Cyl.
(i) [q  [h : q] ].
(ii) (9p :: [q  [h : p] ] ).
(iii) :q 2 Cyl.
Proof. Follows from predicate calculus.
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We will also use the following result, whose proof follows from predicate calculus:
For any predicate q
q 2 Cyl ) (8w; x : k:w = k:x : q:w ) q:x ) (21)
5.1. Security in terms of cylinders
We now use the results in the preceding subsection to simplify the formulation of
security in the weakest precondition calculus. We begin by rewriting (18) as follows.
(8p :: [ [h : wlp:S: [h : p] ]  wlp:S: [h : p] ] )
= f Denition of Cyl (20) g
(8p :: wlp:S: [h : p] 2 Cyl )
= f One-point rule g
(8p; q : [q  [h : p] ] : wlp:S:q 2 Cyl )
= f Nesting and trading g
(8 q :: (8p :: [q  [h : p] ] ) wlp:S:q 2 Cyl ))
= f Predicate calculus g
(8 q :: (9p :: [q  [h : p] ] ) ) wlp:S:q 2 Cyl )
= f Lemma 0(ii), and trading g
(8 q : q 2 Cyl : wlp:S:q 2 Cyl )
Similarly, we rewrite the expression (19) as follows.
[ [h : wp:S:true]  wp:S:true]
= f Denition of Cyl (20) g
wp:S:true 2 Cyl
Putting it all together, we get the following condition for security: For any program S,
S is secure  (8p : p 2 Cyl : wlp:S:p 2 Cyl ) ^ wp:S:true 2 Cyl (22)
6. A simpler characterization
Using (22) to check whether a given program S is secure requires evaluation of the
following term:
(8p : p 2 Cyl : wlp:S:p 2 Cyl ) (23)
Since this formula involves a quantication over all cylinders, it is inconvenient to use.
In this section, we show how this quantication over predicates p can be reduced to a
simpler quantication over the domain of k. In particular, we show that it suces to
consider only cylinders that are of the form \k 6= M", for M ranging over the domain
of k.
124 R. Joshi, K.R.M. Leino / Science of Computer Programming 37 (2000) 113{138
First, we restrict the quantication in formula (23) as described above and rewrite
the resulting expression in relational terms:
(8M :: wlp:S:(k 6= M) 2 Cyl )
) f relational property of cylinders (21) g
(8M :: (8w; x : k:w = k:x : (wlp:S:(k 6= M)):w
)(wlp:S:(k 6= M)): x ))
= f unnesting and relational denition of wlp (11) g
(8M;w; x : k:w = k:x : (8y : whSiy : y =1 _ k:y 6= M )
) (8 z : xhSiz : z =1 _ k:z 6= M ) )
= f unnesting and contrapositive g
(8M;w; x; z : k:w = k:x ^ xhSiz :
z 6=1 ^ k:z = M ) (9y : whSiy : y 6=1 ^ k:y = M ) )
) f one-point rule and weakening (by dropping y 6=1) g
(8w; x; z : k:w = k:x ^ xhSiz :
z 6=1 ) (9y : whSiy : k:y = k:z ))
Next, we rewrite the condition wp:S:true 2 Cyl :
wp:S:true 2 Cyl
) f relational property of cylinders (21) g
(8w; x : k:w = k:x : (wp:S:true):w ) (wp:S:true): x )
= f relational property of wp (12) g
(8w; x : k:w = k:x : (8y : whSiy : y 6=1 )
)(8 z : xhSiz : z 6=1 ))
= f unnesting and contrapositive g
(8w; x; z : k:w = k:x ^ xhSiz :
z =1 ) (9y : whSiy : y =1 ))
) f using z =1 ^ y =1 ) k:y = k:z g
(8w; x; z : k:w = k:x ^ xhSiz :
z =1 ) (9y : whSiy : k:y = k:z ))
Thus, we have
S is secure
= f Condition (22) g
(8p : p 2 Cyl : wlp:S:p 2 Cyl ) ^ wp:S:true 2 Cyl
) f instantiate with cylinders of the form \k 6= M" g
(8M :: wlp:S:(k 6= M) 2 Cyl ) ^ wp:S:true 2 Cyl
) f the two calculations above g
(8w; x; z : k:w = k:x ^ xhSiz :
(z 6=1 ) (9y : whSiy : k:y = k:z ))
^ (z =1 ) (9y : whSiy : k:y = k:z )) )
= f pred calc g
(8w; x; z : k:w = k:x ^ xhSiz : (9y : whSiy : k:y = k:z ))
= f Condition (17) g
S is secure
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Since the rst and last lines are equivalent, we have equivalence throughout, and thus
we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any program S
S is secure  (8M :: wlp:S:(k 6= M) 2 Cyl ) ^ wp:S:true 2 Cyl (24)
Note that this is simpler than (22) since the quantication ranges over the domain
of k.
6.0. Deterministic programs
In the case that S is also known to be deterministic and nonmiraculous, we can
further simplify the security condition (24). A deterministic, nonmiraculous program S
satises the following property [8]:
(8p :: [wp:S:p  :wlp:S:(:p)] ) (25)
Consequently, the term involving wp in (24) is subsumed by the term involving wlp:
wp:S:true 2 Cyl
= f (25), with p := true g
:wlp:S:false 2 Cyl
= f Lemma 0(iii) g
wlp:S:false 2 Cyl
Since it can also be shown that wlp:S:false 2 Cyl follows from (8M :: wlp:S:(k 6=
M) 2 Cyl ) (cf. [16]), the security condition for deterministic S is given by
S is secure  (8M :: wlp:S:(k 6= M) 2 Cyl ) (26)
Next, we show that condition (26) may also be expressed in terms of wp alone:
(8M :: wlp:S:(k 6= M) 2 Cyl )
= f Lemma 0(iii) p 2 Cyl  : p 2 Cyl g
(8M :: : wlp:S:(k 6= M) 2 Cyl )
= f Condition (25) above g
(8M :: wp:S:(k = M) 2 Cyl )
Thus we have another way of expressing the condition for security of deterministic
programs, namely,
S is secure  (8M :: wp:S:(k = M) 2 Cyl ) (27)
6.1. Examples
We now illustrate our formulae with some examples.
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First, we apply the security condition to program (5), which is insecure because of
its termination behavior. Letting N range over the domain of h, we have
(if h = 0 −! skip L true −! loop ) is secure
= f Security condition (24) g
(8M :: wlp:(if h = 0 −! skip L true −! loop ):(k 6= M) 2 Cyl )
^ wp:(if h = 0 −! skip L true −! loop ):true 2 Cyl
= f wlp and wp, using (8p :: [wlp:loop:p  true] )
and [wp:loop:true  false] g
(8M :: ((h = 0 ) k 6= M) ^ (true ) true)) 2 Cyl )
^ ((h = 0 _ true) ^ (h = 0 ) true) ^ (true ) false)) 2 Cyl
= f pred calc g
(8M :: (h = 0 ) k 6= M) 2 Cyl ) ^ false 2 Cyl
= f Lemma 0(i), and false 2 Cyl g
(8M :: [h = 0 ) k 6= M  [h : h = 0 ) k 6= M ] ] )
) f instantiate with M := 2 g
[h = 0 ) k 6= 2  [h : h = 0 ) k 6= 2] ]
= f [p] is shorthand for [h; k : p] g
[h; k : h = 0 ) k 6= 2  [h : h = 0 ) k 6= 2] ]
= f denition of [v : ] , twice; wlp of := g
(8M;N :: wlp:(k; h := M;N ) : ( h = 0 ) k 6= 2
 [h : h = 0 ) k 6= 2] ) )
) f instantiate with M;N := 2; 2 g
2 = 0 ) 2 6= 2  [h : h = 0 ) 2 6= 2]
= f pred calc, identity of  g
[h : h 6= 0]
= f denition of [h : ] g
(8N :: wlp:(h := N ):(h 6= 0) )
) f instantiate with N := 0 g
0 6= 0
= f pred calc g
false
Next, using program (4), we illustrate how one can reason about secure termination
behavior of deterministic programs using wlp.
(if h = 0 −! loop L h 6= 0 −! skip ) is secure
= f Security condition for deterministic programs (26) g
(8M :: wlp:(if h = 0 −! loop L h 6= 0 −! skip ):(k 6= M) 2 Cyl )
= f wlp of if g
(8M :: ((h = 0 ) true) ^ (h 6= 0 ) k 6= M)) 2 Cyl )
= f Denition of Cyl : note h 6= 0 ) k 6= M depends on h g
false
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7. Practical considerations
Despite the simple mathematical nature of our characterization of secure information
ow, there is one serious obstacle to using it in practice: the property p 2 Cyl is neither
monotonic nor antimonotonic in p with respect to the ordering ). Consequently,
security is not preserved by renement. (As an illustration of this, note that the secure
program \assign to k an arbitrary value" is rened by the insecure program \k :=
h".)
This leads to two diculties. The rst is that, since sequential programs are typically
implemented by rening their nondeterminism, there is the possibility that a (nonde-
terministic) secure program received from an adversary is rendered insecure when it
is implemented deterministically. There are at least two ways to address this rst dif-
culty. The rst is to recognize that renements are a concern only if the adversary is
aware of how they are made. If we take the position that the adversary has absolutely
no knowledge of how a program is rened in the process of its implementation (or
how nondeterministic choices are resolved during execution), we can assert that its ob-
servations reveal no information about the initial value of h and so the implementation
is secure. The second way to address this rst diculty is by noting that the problem
does not arise for deterministic programs, since the latter are maximal in the rene-
ment ordering. Thus the diculty is avoided by requiring that programs received from
an adversary be deterministic. This latter approach is similar to the one advocated by
Roscoe [15], who gives several characterizations (corresponding to dierent observa-
tional models) for the secure information ow property for CSP processes. He makes a
persuasive argument for requiring determinism by showing that these characterizations
are all equivalent for deterministic processes.
The second diculty is that in order to check whether wlp:S:p is a cylinder, one
has to compute the exact expression for wlp:S for a given program S. For straight-
line programs, this is straightforward, but for programs with iteration or recursion,
determining the exact expression for wlp requires complex xpoint computations, which
makes this checking unattractive in practice.
One way to address this second diculty would be to require that each program
somehow be annotated with a proof of its security. Verifying security would then
reduce to the task of checking whether the annotations were correct, a task that can be
substantially simpler than proof construction. (This idea has recently been popularized
by Necula and Lee, who call it proof-carrying code [14].)
In the rest of this section, we describe a restriction under which security can be
checked without exact wlp computation. As we will see, our restriction allows us
to check security by checking Hoare triples; thus it can be used to verify programs
annotated with Hoare-style assertions. (Note that, since Hoare triples are closed under
renement, it follows that not only is any program satisfying our restriction secure, but
so are all its renements.)
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We start by introducing two denitions. A program S is said to be functional with
respect to variable k if the initial value of k determines its nal value:
(8w; x; y; z : k :w = k :x ^ whSiy ^ xhSiz : k :y = k :z )
A program S is a function with respect to variable k if it is also total in its domain:
S is a function w.r.t. k  S is functional w.r.t. k ^ S is left-total
The relevance of these notions to secure information ow is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. For any program S;
S is function w.r.t. k ) S is secure
Proof. We begin by rewriting the denition of \functional w.r.t. k" in the relational
calculus.
S is functional w.r.t. k
= f denition g
(8w; x; y; z : k :w = k :x ^ whSiy ^ xhSiz : k :y = k :z )
= f trading, thrice g
(8w; x; y; z : whSiy ^ k :y 6= k :z : k :w 6= k :x _ : xhSiz )
= f trading, de Morgan g
(8w; z :: (8 x; y :: whSiy ^ k :y 6= k :z
) :(k :w = k :x ^ xhSiz) ))
= f pred calc g
(8w; z :: (9y :: whSiy ^ k :y 6= k :z )
) (8 x :: :(k :w = k :x ^ xhSiz) ))
= f de Morgan g
(8w; z :: (9y :: whSiy ^ k :y 6= k :z )
) :(9 x :: k :w = k :x ^ xhSiz ))
= f relational composition, denition of HH g
(8w; z :: whS ; :HH iz ) : whHH ; Siz )
= f relational calculus g
S ; :HH  :(HH ; S)
Remark. In the relational calculus (see, e.g., [7]), the fact that a relation f is \(left-)
functional" is expressed as
f ; :Id  :f:
Note that this may be written as
f ; :Id  :(Id ; f):
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One can view this as a special case of the result above, obtained by taking for k the
entire set of underlying variables and letting h be a constant (i.e., a single variable
whose domain has exactly one element), in which case HH is just Id.
Thus, for any S that is a function with respect to k, we have
true
= f S is left-total g
true  S ; true
= f relational calculus: distributing ; over [ g
true  S ; :HH [ S ; HH
) f S is functional w.r.t k, calculation above g
true  :(HH ; S) [ S ; HH
= f relational calculus: shunting g
HH ; S  S ; HH
= f (15) g
S is secure
Remark. It should be noted that \S is a function w.r.t. k" does not mean that S is
also deterministic, nor vice-versa. The programs HH and k := h serve respectively as
counterexamples.
The following corollary uses the theorem above to derive a formulation for security
in terms of Hoare triples for total correctness.
Corollary 3. For any non-miraculous program S and any function f;
(8M :: f k = M g S f k = f:M g ) ) S is secure:
Proof. In order to avoid case analyses, we extend f to ? by using the convention
that f:? = ?. (Recall that ? is the special value of k in the looping outcome 1.)
We start by rewriting the hypothesis in relational terms:
(8M :: f k = M g S f k = f:M g )
= f Connection between total correctness Hoare triple and wp g
(8M :: [k = M ) wp:S:(k = f:M)] )
= f \[ ]" quanties over all nonlooping states g
(8M :: (8w : w 6=1 : (k = M):w ) wp:S:(k = f:M):w ))
= f Relational property of wp (12) and pred calc g
(8M :: (8w : w 6=1 : k :w = M
) (8y : whSiy : y 6=1 ^ k :y = f:M )))
= f unnesting, trading g
(8M;w; y : w 6=1 ^ k :w = M ^ whSiy :
y 6=1 ^ k :y = f:M )
= f one-point rule and Leibniz g
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(8w; y : w 6=1 ^ whSiy : y 6=1 ^ k :y = f:(k :w) )
) f weakening (by dropping y 6=1) g
(8w; y : w 6=1 ^ whSiy : k :y = f:(k :w) )
= f using w =1 ^ whSiy ) y =1, convention f:? = ? g
(8w; y : whSiy : k :y = f:(k :w) )
Now, assuming the hypothesis, we show that S is a function w.r.t. k, and hence { by
the theorem above { that S is secure. Since S is non-miraculous, the relation S is
left-total, thus it only remains to show that S is functional w.r.t. k. We observe
S is functional w.r.t. k
= f Denition g
(8w; x; y; z :: k :w = k :x ^ whSiy ^ xhSiz ) k :y = k :z )
( f weakening the antecedent by using the calculation above g
(8w; x; y; z :: k :w = k :x ^ k :y = f:(k :w) ^ k :z = f:(k :x)
) k :y = k :z )
( f Rule of Leibniz, since f is a function g
true
We end this section by applying this corollary to a couple of examples.
7.0. Examples
As a rst example, let S be the following program, where k; h are nonnegative
integers.
h := jhj ; while 0< h do h := h− 1 ; k := k + 1 end ; k := h
We sketch the proof that S is secure by applying the Corollary above with the constant
function 0. The annotated program showing f k = M g S f k = 0 g is shown below:
f k = M g
h := jhj
f 06h g
; while 0< h do
f Invariant : 06h g
f Variant function : h g
; h := h− 1
; k := k + 1
end
f h = 0 g
k := h
f k = 0 g
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As a second example, program (2) can be shown to be secure by proving the Hoare
triple
f k = M g k := h ; k := k − h f k = f:M g
where f is the constant function 0. Note that Corollary 3 is not helpful for the two
examples in Section 6.1, since it can only be used to prove programs secure, but not
to declare them insecure. Finally, note that the Corollary cannot be applied to check a
program such as
\assign to k an arbitrary value"
since such a program is not functional with respect to k.
8. Abstract variables
As mentioned in Section 2, one of the features of our semantic approach is that
h and k need not be actual variables of a program. Indeed, as we describe in this
section, our denition of security may be used even when h; k are dened abstractly,
as functions of the actual program variables.
To illustrate the idea, consider a program S operating on a nonempty list ‘ of votes
recorded in an election. Suppose S is supposed to read list ‘ and report the name of
the winner, but not reveal any information about the winning margin of the victor. (For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that ties are resolved in a xed manner, so that there
is always a unique winner, and that the winning margin is always a positive integer.)
To apply our condition to check security of S, we let k denote the function on ‘ that
returns the name of the winner and let h denote the function on ‘ that returns the
winning margin. (Note that both h and k are functions of ‘, but not actual variables
of the program.) We can then use these denitions of k and h to check whether the
program leaks any information about the winning margin.
However, there is one precaution that needs to be observed when using our condition
for security with h and k dened as functions of the underlying program variables. In
justifying that our denition (7) using HH captures the intent that \observations of k
do not leak any information about the initial value of h", we have (implicitly) assumed
that h may be assigned a value independently of k. This allowed us to treat HH as an
arbitrary assignment to h that leaves k unchanged. When h and k are disjoint program
variables, this condition is met trivially and need not be stated explicitly. When they are
functions over the same program variables, however, we need an additional condition
to ensure that h may still be assigned values independently of k. With V ranging over
the domain of the program variables and M;N ranging over the ranges of the functions
k; h respectively, this condition is as follows:
(8M;N :: (9V :: k:V = M ^ h:V = N )) (28)
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For instance, in the example above, M ranges over the set of candidate names and
N ranges over the positive integers. It is easy to show that the independence condition
(28) follows from the fact that given any name M and a winning margin N , there is
at least one choice V for ‘ for which k:V = M and h:V = N (e.g., let V be the list
consisting of the name M repeated N times).
In the following subsection, we illustrate the use of abstract variables with an
example.
8.0. Example
We are given an array a which stores information about the employees of a company.
Each element of a is a record with the following elds:
name; salary; rank;
where rank is of type fManager; Subordinateg. Let S be a program which is supposed
to compute the total salary tot of all subordinates. We show how we can check whether
S leaks any information about the managers.
Clearly type-based schemes are dicult, if not impossible, to use, since records are
distinguished by the value of the rank eld, which cannot be checked syntactically.
However, we can apply our semantic condition by dening h and k as functions of a
and tot in the following way.
For any record r, introduce the shorthands Man and Sub by
Man:r  r:rank = Manager
Sub:r  r:rank = Subordinate
Next, dene two functions pm and ps from arrays to arrays as follows. For any array
A of records,
pm:A = subarray of A consisting of records r satisfying Man:r
ps :A = subarray of A consisting of records r satisfying Sub:r
Now h and k are dened as functions of the concrete variables a and tot as follows:
h = pm:a and k = hps:a; toti:
Note that these denitions satisfy the independence condition (28). (For any given
values N;M for h; k, choose the concrete variable a to be any interleaving of N and
the rst component of M and take tot to be the second component of M .)
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To illustrate how these denitions may be used, we consider the following
program S:
tot := 0
; var j in
j := 0
; while j 6= size:a do
if Sub:(a[j]) then tot := tot + a[j]:salary end
; j := j + 1
end
end
We show that S is secure. Dene auxiliary functions ssum and psum as follows: for
any array A and any integer j
ssum:A= ( i : 06i < size:A : A[i]: salary )
psum:j:A= ( i : 06i < j ^ Sub:(A[i]) : A[i]: salary )
We note the following property about ssum, ps, and psum: for any A
ssum:(ps:A) = psum:(size:A):A: (29)
Finally, we dene function f as follows: for any array A and integer T ,
f:hA; T i = hA; ssum:Ai:
To show that S is secure, it is enough { on account of Theorem 2 { to show that it
satises the following Hoare triple, for any array A and any integer T :
f k = hA; T i g S f k = f:hA; T i g
We sketch the outline of this proof below by annotating S with assertions as follows:
f ps:a=A ^ tot=T g
tot := 0
f ps:a=A ^ tot=0 g
; var j in
j := 0
f ps:a=A ^ tot= j=0 g
; while j 6= size:a do
f Invariant : ps:a=A ^ tot=psum:j:a ^ 06j6size:a g
f Variant function : size:a− j g
if Sub:(a[ j]) then tot := tot + a[ j]:salary end
; j := j + 1
end
end
f ps:a=A ^ tot=psum:(size:a):a g
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9. Related work
The problem of secure information ow has been studied for several decades.
A commonly used mathematical model for secure information ow is Denning’s lattice
model [4], which is based on the Bell and La Padula security model [3]. Most ap-
proaches to static certication of secure information ow (an area pioneered by Denning
and Denning [4,5]) seem to fall into one of two general categories: type systems and
data ow analysis techniques. In this section, we discuss these general approaches and
compare them to our work. A historical perspective of secure information ow appears
in a book by Gasser [9]. Some newer work in this area includes the SLam calculus
[11], Myers and Liskov’s decentralized model whose certication process leaves some
checks until run time [13], and the semantic approach by Sabelfeld and Sands [17].
9.0. Approaches based on type systems
The static certication mechanism proposed by Denning and Denning [5] is es-
sentially a type checker for secure information ow. Each variable x occurring in a
program is declared with a particular security class, denoted by class:x. These security
classes are assumed to form a lattice, ordered by 6, with meet (greatest lower bound)
denoted by # and join (least upper bound) denoted by ". The type checker computes
the class of an expression as the join of the classes of its subexpressions. For example,
for an expression involving addition, we have
class:(E + F) = class:E " class:F
A security class is also assigned to each statement, and is computed as the meet of
the security classes of the variables assigned to by that statement. For instance,
class:(x :=E) = class:x
class:(if E then S else T end) = class:S # class:T
The type checker certies a program S as being secure provided the following two
conditions hold:
0. For every assignment statement x :=E in S; class:E6class:x
1. For every conditional statement if E then T else U end in S,
class:E6class:T and class:E6class:U .
Other programming constructs, such as loops, give rise to similar requirements.
Denning and Denning gave an informal argument for the soundness of their certi-
cation mechanism (i.e., a proof that the mechanism certies only secure programs).
Recently, Volpano et al. have given a more rigorous proof [19,20].
The advantage of using a type system as the basis of a certication mechanism is
that it is simple to implement. However, most certication mechanisms based on types
reject any program that contains an insecure subprogram. As we saw in examples
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(0){(3) of Section 1, a secure program may contain an insecure subprogram. In con-
trast, with a semantic approach like ours, it is possible to identify such programs as
being secure. Another problem with such approaches is that they are dicult to use
for reasoning about programs that leak information via termination behaviour. (Vol-
pano and Smith [18] have attempted to extend their type-based approach to handle
termination behaviour. However, their type system rejects any program that mentions
h in a loop guard. Such an approach seems terribly restrictive.)
9.1. Approaches based on data ow analyses
The key idea behind approaches based on data ow analyses is to transform a given
program S into a program S 0 that provides a simpler representation of the possible data
ows in program S. This is done as follows. (We assume, as in the previous section,
that we are given a lattice of security classes.) For every variable x in program S,
program S 0 contains a variable x0, representing the highest security class of the values
used in computing the current value for x. To deal with implicit ows, S 0 also contains
a special variable local0, representing the lowest security class of the values used to
compute the guards that led to execution of the current instruction. For example, for
every assignment statement in S of the form x :=y + z; S 0 contains a corresponding
statement
x0 :=y0 " z0 " local0
For a conditional statement in S such as
if x=y−!S0 L z < 0 −! S1 
S 0 contains a corresponding statement
var old := local0 in
local0 := local0 " x0 " y0 " z0
; if true −! S00 L true −! S10 
; local0 := old
end
where S00 and S10 are the statements in S 0 that correspond to S0 and S1. If a program
S has the variables k and h belonging to the security classes low and high (denoted
? and >, respectively, where ?6>), then \S is secure" can be expressed as the
following Hoare triple on S 0:
f k 06? ^ h06> ^ local06? g S 0 f k 06? g (30)
The rst data ow analysis approach of this kind was given by Andrews and Reitman
[1], whose treatment also dealt with communicating sequential processes. Bana^tre et al.
[2] used a variation of the method described above that attempts to keep track of the
set of initial variables used to produce a value rather than only the security class of the
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value. They also developed an ecient algorithm for their approach, similar to data ow
analysis algorithms used in compilers, and attempted a proof of soundness. (Unlike our
description above, Andrews and Reitman used the deterministic if then else construct
rather than Dijkstra’s if  construct. Bana^tre et al. used the if  construct, but, as
Volpano et al. point out, their soundness theorem is actually false for nondeterministic
programs [20].)
The data ow analysis approach can provide more precision than the simple type
system approach mentioned in the previous section. For example, the data ow anal-
ysis approach would certify programs (0) and (1). However, the approach still rejects
some secure programs that our approach will certify. This comes about because of
two reasons. The rst reason is that the semantics of operators like + and − are lost
in the rewriting of S into S 0. Thus a program like (2), which is secure on account
of that h − h=0, is rejected by the data ow analysis approach. The second reason
is that guards are replaced by true in the rewriting of S into S 0. Thus, a program
like (3), whose security depends on when control can reach a certain statement, is
rejected.
One way to improve on this approach is to augment it with a logic, as suggested by
Andrews and Reitman [1]. Instead of rewriting program S into S 0, one superimposes
new variables (k 0; h0; local0) and their updates onto program S, and then reasons
about S using the Hoare triple (30) but with S instead of S 0. A consequence of this
approach is that one can rule out some impossible control paths, such as the one in
program (3).
10. Summary
We have presented a simple and new mathematical characterization of what it means
for a program to have secure information ow. The characterization is general enough
to accommodate reasoning about a variety of covert ows, including nontermination.
Unlike previous methods, which were based on type systems and compiler data ow
analysis techniques, our characterization is in terms of program semantics, thus it is
more precise than these syntactic approaches.
The precision of a semantic approach comes at a price, which includes nding various
x-points that characterize the semantics of iterative or recursive program constructs.
We have shown that this cost can be reduced for a restricted set of programs, for
which the security condition follows from a Hoare triple.
We have also shown how our denition may be applied when high- and low-security
variables are dened abstractly.
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